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ABSTRACT
Decreasing the role of state in economics generally and of public sector particularly 
has been a fashionable policy means since the 1980s, being implemented in both 
developed and underdeveloped countries Among the developing countries, Turkish 
experience in privatization has been initiated timely, yet it has been implemented 
discontinuously due to serious political obstacles.
Appearing first on the policy agenda of the Motherland Party in 1983 and being a 
party of the "Neo-Liberal Economics" initiated with the Januaiy 24 Measures, 
privatization has been undertaken continually, but not continuously in Turkey up until 
today. However, the privatization of the 1990s differ from the 1980s in terms of its 
methods, objectives and assumptions. Although there are some similarities, 
privatization in the 1990s reflects the ideologies of the new coalition-government 
formed by the True Path Party and Social Democratic Populist Party in 1991. The 
second term of this coalition under the leadership o f Tansu Çiller gave birth to a 
polarization and various confrontations about privatization even among the coalition 
partners which came to surface particularly after the April 5 Measures.
The main purpose o f this study is to analyze the Turkish privatization experiences 
both in the 1980s and 1990s, trying to show the similarities and differences by 
focusing on the changing perceptions about this particular policy in order to draw 
some lessons for future prospects.
ÖZET
Gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde devletin ekonomiye katkısı ve kamu sektör 
payının gayrı safı milli hasılada azaltılması. 1980 li yılların baskın politikalarından biri 
olmuştur. Gelişmekte olan ülkeler sınıfına giren fürkıye 'de. özelleştirme zamanında 
başlatılmasına karşın, politik engeller yüzünden düzenli olarak uygulamaya 
geçirilememiştir.
İlk kez 198-1 'te Anavatan Partisi gündeminde yer alan ve 24 Ocak Kararları ile 
başlatılan "Yeni-Liberal Ekonomi" anlayışının bir parçası olan özelleştirmepolitikası, 
bugüne kadar devamlı olarak ele alınmış ama uygulamaya bir süreklilik 
getirilememiştir. Buna bağlı olarak, Türkiye 'de, 1990 'lı yıllarda özelleştirme çabalan 
1980 'li yıllardakinden metod, amaç ve varsayım açısından farklılıklar göstermektedir. 
Bazı benzerlikler olmasına karşın, 1990 'lardaki özelleştirme politikası 1991 yılında 
Doğru Yol Partisi ve Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti tarafından kurulan yeni koalisyon 
hükümetinin ideolojik farklılıklarını yansıtmaktadır. Tansu Çiller 'in başbakanlığa 
seçilmesiyle başlayan ikinci ortaklık sürecinde ise, özelleştirme konusunda bir 
kutuplaşma başgöstermiş ve 5 Nisan kararları ile tartışmalar daha da sertleşmiştir.
Bu çalışmanın amacı ise, değişen politika ve anlayışları gözönünde tutarak, Türkiye 'de 
1980 ve 1990 'lı yıllarda özelleştirme politikalarını karşılaştırmak, benzerlik ve 
farklılıkları ortaya koyarak, gelecek için bazı dersler çıkarmaktır.
TABLE OF COIN r ENTS
Abstract
Özet
Table of Contents 
List of Tables 
List of Figures
Chapter One: INTRODUCTION
A. The Rise of Privatization
1. The Meaning of "Small State"
2 Political Dimension of Privatization
a. External Factors
b. Internal Factors
3. Economic Dimension and Objectives of Privatization
B. Privatization Examples From Other Countries
1. An Overview of Privatization in LDCs
2. The French Experience in Privatization
3. Privatization in England: The Model of Popular Capitalism
Chapter Two: PRIVATIZATION IN TURKEY
A. Post-1980 Liberalization Efforts
1. Opposition Against Liberal Efforts
2. A New Era For SEEs
B. Privatization by the Motherland Party
I . Early Efforts of Privatization
a. Revenue Sharing Certificates
b. Search for a Master Plan, Search for a Strategy?
c. Why did the First Success Story Turn into Failure'^ 
d Search for Alternative Modes
C Opposition Against the Block-Sales to Foreigners
D. Concludinu Remarks
11 
iii
V
V 
1 
1
4
7
8 
9 
9
12 
13 
18 
22 
31 
31 
33 
33 
35 
37
37
38
39
40 
40 
43
1
III
Chapter Three: PRIVATIZATION IN THE 1990s
A. General Outlook of 1990s
B. The New Government and Reform Process
48
48
49
C, Tansu Çiller's Coalition Period - Beginning of Polarization About Privatization 51
1. Procedural Differences as Barriers
2. Principle Obstacles and Methodological Differences
3. Ideological Differences
4. Lack of Tranparency and Consequent Lack of Trust
5. Statism versus Neo-Liberalism Regarding Legislation
D An Overview of Privatization in Turkey, fhe Regulatory Framework
E. World Bank Assistance: What are the Strings Attached
F. Concluding Remarks 
Chapter Four: CONCLUSION
A. Evaluation of Comparisons
B. Concluding Remarks 
Bibliography
32
53
55
56
58
59 
61 
62 
66 
66 
73
IV
LIST OF TABLES
Table I- Financial Index of SEEs Regarding Profitability (1990-1992) 
Table 2- Revenues o f Privatization in Turkey According to Methodology
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1- Public Enterprise Divestitures in Developing Countries in the 1980s 
Figure 2- Number of SEEs Privatized in Developing Countries by Region, 1980-91
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A. The Rise of Privatization
The history o f the concept of privatization, which held an important part o f the 
Turkish agenda, is not long. The idea was put forward by M. Friedman, who was 
one o f the the most important figures o f supply-side economics in 1970 (1). 
Privatization was one of the policies that was adopted against unemployment and 
stagnation coming with the inflation, by understating the role o f public sector. 
Today, both capitalist and socialist governments are trying to adopt privatization in 
developed and underdeveloped countries. As an economic and political policy, 
privatization measures have been widely undertaken in more than fifty countries 
around the world.
The scope o f this study is analyzing the privatization attempts in Turkey, including 
both the 1980s and 1990s by showing the similarities and differences. Chapter 
One is going to deal with the basic principles of privatization involving conceptual 
definitions like the meaning of "small state". The aim is laying out the foundations of 
privatization, so that the analysis will be more clear in the readers' mind· Privatization 
examples from other countries will also be given to draw up some lessons for 
Turkey. An overview of the privatization process in LDCs (Less Developed 
Countries) will be outlined here, as similar objectives and methods were pursued by 
the Turkish government. On the other hand, British and French experiences are also 
introduced for comparative purposes. As one o f Mrs. Thatcher's contributions into
the international agenda, British privatization became the pioneer in the world paving 
the way of this policy to many countries including Turkey. I will also be analyzing 
the French privatization in which the process was not subjected to ideological 
confrontations, allowing them to make successflil privatizations although they 
were a latecomer.
In the second chapter, the Motherland Party (MP) experience with privatization in 
Turkey will be examined. This privatization program was one of the new 
components o f the 24 January Measures which was initiated in 1980. Privatization 
process in Turkey was pioneered by Turgut Ozal, which was strategic and 
pragmatic in character first, when his party came to power with the general elections 
in 1983.
The third chapter will focus on the privatization efforts o f True Path Party (TPP) 
and Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) coalition-government in Turkey after 
the 1990s. A slow progress was made under the prime ministry o f Süleyman 
Demirel who was the first leader of the coalition (49th government). During his 
leadership there was an amount of cohesiveness among the coalition partners 
regarding privatization. Real deadlock and polarization about the divestiture attempts 
began after Tansu Çiller got the office. As the privatization process was converted 
into a highly personalized and ideological movement, early convergence in the 
government was deteriorated. Especially after the April 5 Austerity Measures, which 
was prepared and activated by Tansu Çiller, confrontations in government and in 
society at large have started being structural, legal, ideological and methodological in 
character. Each o f these differences will be taken in detail in the following pages.
In the fourth and last chapter, a comparison will be made about the privatization 
implementations between the MP and TPP-SDPP coalition government. Here again 
the aim is drawing some policy lessons from today's and pas^ experiences for future 
prospects.
The liberal policies that were adopted after the 1970s mainly aimed to understate the 
public sector that expanded continously. Privatization seemed to be a solution; so 
different techniques were used in this direction. However, some legal, social, political 
and economic barriers as a consequence o f various sociopolitical traditions and 
habits are not easily managed (DPT, 1993,p.3). Thus, when privatization is adopted, 
some economic and political reactions are likely to be faced by that particular 
government, in all countnes where privatization is chosen.
Privatization was one of the most debated issues in Turkey during the 1980s and 
1990s. What was reflected in the mass media was solely the " selling o f State 
Economic Enterprises" (hereafter cited as SEEs) which is a reductionist 
understanding. Yet, this stage of privatization is essential for Turkey. This is 
because the most visible pattern of privatization in Turkey is the sale of public 
enterprises (hereafter cited as PEs) to private investors. The statist policies 
adopted in this country since 1930, which relied heavily on PEs for development as 
stated in 1924 and 1961 Constitutions, makes the sale o f SEEs significant, as the 
positive inputs of PEs turned out to be negative in the last two decades. Various 
reasons for this negative outcomes will be explained below.
Pnvatization is a set o f means , rather than an end (2). The ultimate goal is shifting to 
free-market economics, which is reuarded as the most efficient and rational model. In
Turkey, the SEEs are the most important barriers on the way of privatization, 
because of their status. During the statist era of the 1930s, when SEEs were not 
included into political manoeuvres -aiming at more votes- they had an important 
contribution to the industrialization of Turkey. Since there was insufficient capital 
accumulation, businessmen and a private sector were without sources, therefore; 
the state played the leading figure in development. Today, SEEs has become 
subjected to high levels of patron -client relationships as a result of partisanship. 
This partisanship was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Since there was a limited 
institutional permeation o f the periphery by the center, the control mechanisms at 
the local level was inadequate (Sunar and Sayan, 1980.p. 166). Thus, nepotism based 
on local provincial relations increased the importance of political sinecures overtime. 
The relations between center and periphery in terms o f the system of power 
showed continuity in the following Republican period (3). Thus, the most common 
cause o f inefficiency in Turkish public sector has been political interference 
especially since the 1970s, Meanwhile, the social welfare function of the SEEs has 
been reduced to overemployment at the lost o f inefficiency.
1) The Meaning of "Small-State”
It is true that when the SEEs are privatized, the state becomes "smaller", ceteris 
paribus. Today, new responsibilities are being added to the "state"s agenda and its 
services are increasing both in terms of quality and quantity, due to the 
improvements in techniques, technology, transportation and telecommunications. 
Consequently, state expenditures rise; therefore, state gets "bigger" by definition. 
Yet, state being a political entity must be big in socio-politics and small in economics. 
In terms of free-market economics, the market must be free of state regulations, so
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1) The Meaning of "Small-State"
It is true that when the SEEs are privatized, the state becomes "smaller", ceteris 
paribus. Today, new responsibilities are being added to the "state"s agenda and its 
services are increasing both in terms o f quality and quantity, due to the 
improvements in techniques, technology, transportation and telecommunications. 
Consequently, state expenditures rise; therefore, state gets "bigger" by definition. 
Yet, state being a political entity must be big in socio-politics and small in economics. 
In terms of free-market economics, the market must be free of state regulations, so
that market-forces such as demand and supply can rule the economy. Rather than 
intervening into the economy by regulating it from above , the private sector should 
control the market. One way of this is through privatization, by allowing the private 
sector to buy PEs. Then, the state will be able to serve its basic functions such as 
maintaining law and order, building and development of infrastructure, providing 
military-security, health and education seiwices and establishing the necessary 
environment by investing both in people and other longterm projects for an efficient 
economy. Parallel to this line of thinking, Vecihi Ünal stated (in Türkiye on 7th of 
April, 1994) that; the only way of enlarging the social and political state was 
minimizing the economic one (4).
What is more important than minimizing the state in economy is reducing the state 
structure in terms of bureaucracy. The sale of public/state assets to the private 
sector is not enough in achieving success during privatization movement. The first 
extensive attempt o f debureaucratization in Turkey was initiated by the MP under 
the leadership o f Turgut Ozal. According to Heper, after the 1980 military 
intervention, the withdrawal of state elite, particularly from the economic sphere 
was paralleled by the program of MP government which aimed at a liberal 
revolution after the January 24 Measures (1990, p. 610). Turgut Ozal's goal was 
decreasing the influence o f the public bureaucracy as a whole, because they could 
not catch-up with the dynamism o f his government's policies. The clearest indication 
o f Mr. Ozal's attempt at this point was the transfer o f some functions from the 
existing - agencies to newly created ones (5). For example, the Ministry of Finance 
still carried the responsibility o f collecting public revenues, while the newly 
established Undersecretariat for Treasury and Foreign Trade was to implement 
economic, financial and monetary policies. This institution, too, was headed by a
technocrat who was brought in from outside the bureaucracy. As can be seen from 
these restructuring attempts, "small state" does not demand solely the sale of SEEs.
In 1994 with the April 5 Vieasures, similar methods were used by Tansu Çiller who 
became the prime minister under TPP-SDPP coalition government, ten years later. 
Mrs. Çiller also aimed at establishing new institutions for the implementation of 
privatization like the Department of Privatization (Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı) 
which had to be abolished today due to legal restrictions (6). This was partly due to 
the personalized attempts of Mrs, Çiller about privatization and partly due to the lack 
of consensus among the coalition members of the 50th government Social 
democrats of the coalition government differ from the TPP wing in their 
understandings on privatization and the role that the "state" should play. SDPP 
believes in the restructuring o f SEEs, rather than selling them immediately to foreign 
investors. SDPP in fact rejects the ideology of "Neo-Liberalism" which was based 
on the complete non-interference of state into the ifee-market (7). TÖYÖK 
(Institution o f Turkish Autonomy Restructuring and Privatization) which was 
established in 1992, was another point o f differentiation among the 50th coalition 
government under Tansu Çiller. Arguments were focused on whether autonomy 
should be given first to the PEs like it was agreed in the protocol of 49th 
government under Süleyman Demirel, or whether SDPP should allow Tansu Çiller 
to engage in sales o f state enterprises to foreign investors directly. SDPP favors a 
piecemeal and gradual process o f privatization, rather than a quick wholesale one 
based on the block-sales to foreign capital as favored by TPP since 1992.
On the other hand, privatization by MP was a strategic and pragmatic policy choice, 
being the outcome of the new-economic policy of Turkey based on liberalism and
expon-orientation which was initiated by the January 24 Measures in 1980. These 
measures have attempted at forming both a master plan and sequencing of 
privatization according to the plan. During Tansu Çiller's coalition, the principles of 
privatization in the large sense have been given the back seat, and its implementation 
for fiscal purposes in the short-run has been given priority. Yet, there are slight 
differences in the outcomes of privatization policies during both periods as will be 
seen later.
2) Political Dimension of Privatization
If we make a broad definition, privatization is the denationalization o f state property 
by selling them to the public, as well as the liberalization of state control and 
intervention over the market. In its narrower sense, privatization is the transfer of 
the responsibilities o f state, in terms of production of goods and commodities to the 
private sector (Ôzgida-îç ,1992, p.23).
Privatization whatever its aim or reason is a matter of political will. The ultimate 
political and social aims of privatization are diffusion of capital by enlarging 
individual private ownership, and putting the political philosophy into practice 
(Cevizlioglu, 1989,p.33). This philosophy, put forward by the Neo-Classical 
economists, takes the form of "Economic individualism", giving support to the idea 
o f reducing state intervention in order not to restrict individual liberties regarding 
economic activities. This is largely just what the January 24 Measures had aimed at 
in Turkey. On the other hand as Mat has noted, ownership must be diffused as 
widely as possible in order for privatization to be effective and fair (1988,p. 5). Yet, 
the political choice is not independent, rather it is shaped by the social, economic and
political reasons. These may be divided into two main factors :
a) External Factors :
It is not possible for a political authority to be unaffected by international 
developments. The principle of "lessening the role of public sector within the 
economy" which was a result o f "supply side economics" emerging in the 1970s, 
was accepted by many governments. Consequently, following England as a pioneer, 
privatization was adopted in different countries, even among the former socialist 
block. It should also be mentioned that, some countries (especially developing ones) 
were influenced by international organizations like International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank (WB) which have been advocates o f privatization efforts. 
IMF and WB in particular were influential especially during the MP rule, by devoting 
their resources for the reform of SEEs in Turkey,
In 1988, the WB on the other hand, established a task force to assess the role o f the 
private sector in development in order to propose how it could best help member 
countries in strengthening their private sector's contnbution to development (World 
Bank Group, 1991). WB's country assistance programs are increasingly focused 
upon the priority o f :
• Improving the business environment,
•  Restructuring o f public sector,
•  Financial sector development and entrepreneurial support (8),
all o f which aimed at increasing flexibility and reducing risk and uncertainties within 
the public side of the economy.
b) Internal Factors .
Internal factors mainly includes the interest, pressure and occupational groups as 
well as all communication means and mass media. Public opinion and mass media 
may shape or lead the political authority by exerting pressure. Interest groups, 
such as T'USiAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association) in Turkey, 
may have an advising role so that new alternative policy strategies will be found. 
Pressure groups on the other hand, like TURK-i§ (Turkish Confederation of 
Workers' Union), can influence the final decision in accordance with the needs of 
employees. Thus, in converting ideals into reality, the governments are effected by 
these Items.
3) Economic Dimension and Objectives of Privatization
Economic dimension o f privatization mainly aims at three goals. First, the aim is to 
establish the dynamics of free-market structure within the SEE sector. This can be 
done by creating suitable grounds for competition, following the goals o f 
profitability by the enterprise, and following the technological inventions. Among 
these, competition forms the basis o f "efficiency", so it is the prime factor. Second 
goal concerns macroeconomics. Privatization aims at lessening the share o f public 
sector within the economy. When this is attained, consequently the debts of the 
public sector will decrease. The "rolling back the state apparatus" within the debates 
in Turkey are based on this assumption. In Turkey, the aim is making the state more 
effective in its traditional roles such as providing the integrity of the system of rule 
o f law, rather than participating in the production. Third goal is about redistribution, 
by selling the bonds of PEs to expand the capital, just like what Turgut Ozal tried to
manage with the introduction of Revenue Sharing Certificates in 1983 and sale of 
Teleta§ in 1988. Thus, the third goal has social, economic and political implications.
The major reason why SEEs are less effective than the private enterprises in 
Turkey IS that, Turkish SEEs lack the conditions for maximum efficiency, or 
maximizing efficiency an enterprise needs .
• Increasing market competition,
• Establishing total control over the enterprise by the owners (in Turkey, the 
bureaucrats within the public sector look after their own interests in order to 
maintain control in their own hands),
• Accepting the principles of profit maximization (DPT, 1993,p.l4).
In Turkey, PEs lack the above characteristics as they show monopolistic structures, 
as well as serving to other political interests such as partisanship or nepotism in an 
environment of sinecurism.
As mentioned above, with the MP after January 24 Measures, privatization is a 
means that a country chooses on its way to the ultimate goal o f shifting to 
ffee-market economics (9). Although the basic goal is limiting state intervention in 
economics, it is inevitable that the state will make necessary laws and regulations in 
order to make ffee-market economics more efficient. The state must play some role 
in encouraging the ffee-market principles as well as simplifying them instead of 
establishing additional state-led enterprises producing goods and commodities.
A report which was presented in an international seminar sums up the targets of
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privatization in mainly three stages (10):
a) Reducing the financial and administrative burden of the state,
b) Increasing competition as \vell as efficiency within the enterprises,
c) Lessening the role of public sector within economy .
With privatization, some negative outcomes are expected to be eliminated and with 
the shift o f SEEis into private sector, their burden upon the state treasury will be 
reduced. Those negative outcomes are mainly caused by the inability of PEs in 
catching-up technological innovations as well as the political choices which favor the 
increase of manpower costs within them. Because o f their monopolistic nature, PEs 
keep control of the market and they are not under the threat o f a potential 
bankruptcy. Their possible losses will be compensated from the state treasury, 
which in turn increases their monopolistic power. As SEEs are unresponsive to the 
demands of the market, they do not increase the quality in production. Besides, 
decreasing the prices o f the goods and commodities overtime, creates additional 
burden on the government.
Under these circumstances, the efficiency o f the PEs decreases eventually. Besides, 
the SEEs in Turkey lack well established organizational structures. This is basically 
because the political parties in power have always been subjected to their members' 
ideologies and choices, so they were not able to establish a continues and efficient 
administrative system (11).
The governments which are involved in privatization programs face problems 
mostly during implementation. These problems vary from those emerging from the
initial definition of liberalism and privatization (12), to the operation (the methods 
used) of the policy together with its social consequences. These will be discussed in 
chapters two and three. Temporary unemployment of the privatized enterprise is 
another outcome to be dealt with by the countries involved in privatization. Having 
large amount o f public employees placed in SEE sector in our country, the 
unemployment which will be created by privatization becomes more important. PEs 
in Turkey, have both inert manpower and idle capacity which will be reduced if 
employment can be shifted to private sector. Overemployment in state enterprises 
increase the production costs and this is reflected on the products, showing that the 
right employment policies are not implemented. One solution to this problem is 
laying-off the workers by paying indemnity. Still, a more appropriate way is 
managing a reorganization for additional production which could accommodate the 
excess laborforce. With privatization, a new social class emerges which is formed 
by the workers who had to leave, yet at the same time can become shareholders to 
that enterprise (13).
B-Privatization Examples From Other Countries
In most developed and developing countries state ownership of enterprises 
expanded rapidly in the forty years following the end of World War Two, 
Governments created PEs mostly to provide services. Yet, PEs often became means 
for politicians to create independent bases of power. As a result, the debates 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s about the need to privatize many of the functions 
performed by PEs motivated many governments to engage in this policy. The
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privatization attempts in LDCs together with the British experience as the exemplary 
model will be summarized here. British privatization is important which 
demonstrates both in practicing difRision of capital and giving an inspiration to 
many LDCs including Turkey. The privatization movements in France which is a 
latecomer will also be outlined. Aim is to draw some lessons from the French- 
privatization showing how the policy makers in France developed their programs 
faster than Turkey, even if they had started later.
1) An Overview of Privatization in LDCs
While the information technology has eroded the economic and national boundaries, 
there are still man-made barriers to the internationalization of business (Turner and 
Hodges, 1992, p.22). Dismantling these limits required political leadership and at this 
point market-oriented leaders such as Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher took the lead 
in preparing the world for free-market economy. Increasing the role of "market" in 
LDCs required a strategy of economic liberalization, involving the removal of 
various forms o f government intervention which "distorted" the market mechanism 
(Kirkpatrick, 1988, p.9).
One o f the most common features of public enterprises in LDCs, like Turkey, has 
been increasing deficits. PE deficits in LDCs are financed either by borrowing in 
domestic or international financial markets or by the central government transfers. 
In mid-1970s, about 25 percent o f the PE deficits were met by direct foreign 
borrowing (14). Between 1976-78, according to World Bank reports, SEEs 
accounted for one-third o f all international borrowing by LDCs. On the other hand, 
60 percent was financed from central-governments and banking systems. These PE
sector deficits contribute to inflation and balance of payments difficulties in LDCs.
Seeing privatization as a panacea mainly to overcome deficits, rather than mainly a 
policy option, many LDCs started to implement it (Figure One). Having initiated 
privatization in principle at the right time (right after the January 24 Measures) in 
1983 with the MP together with other developing countries in Asia, Turkey was 
also included into the 8%. Latin America in particular has the longest history and 
most successful cases of privatization (Figure Two) within the framework of 
structural adjustment programs. These programs mainly aimed at achieving a 
balance between private and public sectors where the scales have heavily been 
placed in favor of the public side o f the economy. Privatization experience in Chile 
began in 1974. In Mexico, PEs in the tourism (hotel) and car industry have been 
sold. Brazil also made up a list o f 520 companies for partial denationalization (15). 
Despite these examples, limited divestiture has been taken place in LDCs. Basic 
reason for this was the difficulty for developing countries to set an appropriate 
market value for the asset sales and insufficient capital markets to handle the sales. 
Similarly, the Istanbul Stock Market in Turkey was unsatisfactory in managing the 
sales when the MP government decided to sell the shares o f Teletaş in 1988. 
Resistance of interest groups were also influential as labor forces were threatened 
by job-losses.
As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, the emphasis has been on the state regulating, 
the economy, as a whole. Consequently, the economic and social importance of SEEs 
were far greater than in the rest of the world. The basic tactic used for the Eastern 
European countries was privatizing in all possible ways that encourages competition 
(Gidadhubli-Kumar, 1993, p. 1216). Since it is a systemic overhaul, the basic model
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that was implemented m Eastern Europe was "shock measures" (16). As the pace of 
privatization was highly rapid, Eastern European countries seems to diverge from 
the traditional British model o f selling productive assets o f the state to the private 
sector in a gradual manner. In sum, their model was a thoroughly ideological one.
Among the LDCs, the Mexican experience in particular can be regarded as a good 
example of carefully-planned-and-implemented privatization program (Görüş, 1993, 
p.38). Mexican privatization program started in 1983 as part o f IMF stabilization 
program in the same period. During the 1970s, as the international economic system 
has been experiencing a rapid increase in oil prices, Mexican state, due to rich oil 
resources in the Mexican Bay, found itself in a strong position to intervene in the 
economy. The increase in state revenues pushed the socialist government to 
pursue a populist policy of social welfare programs. In order to continue its radical 
development policies. The Mexican state also used foreign borrowing which 
increased to $78 billion in 1991 from $7 billion in 1974. However after the decrease 
o f oil prices in 1982, Mexico was dragged into a debt crisis. This was the time when 
debt-equity transactions were introduced by the government. When the fiscal 
damage of 1985 Mexican-Earthquake was added, the inflation jumped to 106 percent 
in 1985 and to 159 percent in 1987 (17).
The privatization movement which was limited to small scale enterprises initially was 
enlarged due to the economic fluctuations. 940 SEEs out of 1155 were closed, 
transferred or sold. At this moment, the income of Mexican government reached 
about $ 14 billion. Even during the extensive privatization period, Mexico began 
divesting by giving priority to small and medium-sized firms. Such sales were 
simpler and quicker in character and they required little prior restructuring, entailing
minimal political risk. As has already been noted, since small and medium-sized 
enterprises were more easily absorbed by local private investors and they need less 
technological updating, the thorny issue of foreign ownership has also been reduced 
(Kikeri-Nellis-Shirley, 1992,p.48),
The extensive privatization movement started in 1989 under president Salinas, 
included the liberalization o f trade, debt-equity swaps (18) and liberalization of 
domestic market. An ideal debt-equity conversion is one in which incremental 
foreign investment is mobilized for the export sector and opportunities for local 
ownership are established (Basile, 1990, p i 52) These conditions might be met in 
the context of privatization programs and comprehensive policy reforms to improve 
the investment climate of the host country. In Turkey on the other hand, as reform 
process is converted into "rapid pnvatization by all means to foreign investors " 
without incrementalism after the April 5 Measures by the 50th coalition government 
under Tansu Çiller, this kind of transaction is hard to be implemented. Initiated in 
April 1986, Mexico's debt conversion program is being viewed by other debtor 
nations as a major testing ground (19).
What differs Mexican privatization from the Turkish example is that, a special 
Privatization Department was established which could work in an environment of 
consensus regarding the divestiture aims (20). The TÖYÖK which was 
established in a likely manner in Turkey was not of a success, because o f legal 
constraints and lack o f agreement between the 49th and 50th coalition governments. 
One of the responsibilities of the Mexican Privatization Department was to inform 
the public and managers of relevant institutions about developments in the 
divestiture operations within the privatization phase. There is no similarity between
16
Mexican privatization and Tansu Çiller's implementation as she has highly 
personalized the privatization activities in Turkey (21). Having the cooperation of 
Turkish workers within the privatization movement or even the participation of 
business is not endeavoured in Turkey.
Thus, the lessons that can be drawn from the Mexican privatization movement is 
that, it is useful to centralize the divestiture decisions within a special department, 
but the decisions and preparations must be transparent. Privatization policies must 
also be backed by both media and public opinion. Most important of all, there has to 
be a social consensus. Turkey started privatization at the right time, but the process 
has been mistaken and slow. The governments in Turkey since 1983, especially the 
50th coalition headed by Tansu Çiller, wanted to implement privatization in a rapid 
manner, but due to the lack of consensus among political parties in the parliament, 
media, elite and managers, the policy can not be implemented so fast in reality. 
Turkey is still busy with the discussions on the program. These discussions also 
continue even during the austerity measures o f 5th April 1994 is being activated, a 
period in which radical and rapid decisions must be taken. Ideological, definitional, 
legal and operational struggles seem to be endless. Unlike Mexican experience, in 
Turkey, the priority is given to sale of big enterprises such as Turkish Electricity 
Corporation (ТЕК). When this is the situation, Turkish government has to deal with 
a sophisticated financial engineering, sensitive labor restructuring and a complex 
regulatory framework, all o f which are impossible to be dealt with simultaneously.
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Governments have all turned increasingly to privatization of state assets and services, 
as well as other market oriented reforms to solve their immediate economic 
problems. In the West, this trend has been especially pronounced in the countries of 
European Community (EC). France in particular, has been an exception to the neo­
liberal trends. France experimented Keynesianism, while its partners were 
abandoning such policies. This can be traced back to France's dirigist political culture, 
which shows similar characteristics with Turkey. In France, like Turkey, the public 
sector is unilinear and deterministic about the implementation of policies. The French 
case is a good example of bureaucratic state elite attempting to control polity and 
society from above (22). Turkey at this point is like France with respect to etatism 
(23). That is, French bureaucracy is centralised. There is a strong state tradition in 
France where the government has worked to break interest group monopolies 
(Heper, 1991, p.7). Similar to Turkey, the government in France failed to involve 
interest groups in the policy making process, controlling the society in an 
autonomous fashion. Under Jacques Delors' presidency o f the French Republic; 
however, France sought to change its way by mixing traditional liberalism with a 
"social character" (Feigenbaum, 1991, p. 1). That is, privatization measures were 
hand in hand with the social state programs.
2) The French Experience
In France, both Socialist and Conservative governments stressed privatization , but 
they did it for’different reasons. Socialist privatization mainly aimed at deregulation 
(tiying to increase efficiency in PEs by freeing them from legal restrictions). 
Deregulation was largely motivated by the early failures of nationalizations and 
Keynesianism which directed the French economy. On the other hand. Conservative
privatization aimed at state-asset sales mainly for financial needs. As Feigenbaum 
had argued, socialist privatization was pragmatic (being piecemeal, gradual and 
process oriented) like MP privatization program of Turgut Ozal after the January 24 
Measures, while a more tactical (in the sense of an electoral promise for obtaining 
votes) path was followed by the Conservatives.
What is unusual about France was the environment which made continuous state 
intervention acceptable. The French private sector was traditionally passive. The 
country from which the word "entrepreneur" originated had few of them 
(Feigenbaum, 1991, p.3). French businessmen have been risk averse and they rarely 
attempted commercial intentions. In France, similar to Turkey, liberalization was 
originated by technocrats, rather than by the economic theorists of the Right. The 
break with statism emerged in 1974, with the election of Valery Giscard d' Estaing 
to the Presidency. Previous presidents had been conservatives and their ideology 
was closer to a powerful central state. According to them, public interests and 
national unity stood in stark contrast to the image of competing selfish interests. 
The state in Giscard's view on the other hand was inefficient as an economic actor. 
Still, he faced further difficulties. Neither the administration, nor Giscard's coalition 
partners were eager to roll back the state apparatus that they in fact controlled. 
Interest groups also favored existing policies and programs. In 1981, Socialists 
came to power and gave statism a momentum (24). Most nationalizations had been 
brought back to profitability under socialist management. This formed the focus of 
attacks by the conservative opposition. The Socialists allowed problem industries to 
shed perif»?nnel, which resulted in dramatic unemployment rates. Hence, they had 
actually initiated restructuring of prior SEEs.
Conservatives were interested in denationalization as an electoral strategy, France's 
goal was spreading ownership so widely that, companies would not easily be 
renationalized (Vuylsteke, 1992, p,121). After Jacques Chirac came to power on 
March 16, 1986. Conservatives passed Law-86-763 on July 2, 1986. authorizing 
the denationalization of about 66 firms. In fact, the aim was to privatize all public 
sector firms, where the possibility for competitive markets existed until 1991, which
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was the end of their parliamentary term. Main justification for denationalization was 
the inefficient public management. Yet, the fundamental reason for privatization was 
the expected fiscal inflow from the sale of public assets. Estimations were over 200 
billion francs This inflow would be used for industrial policies. The obtained money 
would allow the government to cut taxes, which would increase profit margins; thus 
encouraging investments. On the other side. Conservatives were attacked by the 
charge that, strategic firms would be bought by foreigners. Consequently, the 
National Assembly enabled foreigners to purchase a maximum of up to 20 percent 
o f any previously public corporation. This was done after Mitterand’s refusal to sign 
the original privatization decree on the basis of national interests. Under the French 
Constitution, this forced the bill to be resubmitted to the National Assembly, 
culminating in the control of state upon the sales.
One o f the most important efforts of J. Chirac was his attitude towards the banking 
sector which is the most favored sector in privatization efforts elsewhere as well. 
Chriac's program for the privatization o f banking was part of his government's 
desire for a broader withdrawal o f the state from the national economy (Lancester, 
1990, p.378). The Chirac government planned to sell 65 banking groups including 
agricultural and industrial ones. For example. Société Generale, which was one of 
the best capitalized state owned banks, was also privatized. This sale symbolized the
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extent o f Chirac's privatization policy, it was argued that. The Right's prior concern 
for dirigism was now clearly secondary to the 1980s denationalization trend (25). In 
contrast, when we look at the Apnl 5 Measures initiated by Tansu Çiller, we see that 
no such regulations have been introduced in the banking system and interest-rate 
policies in Turkey. State-owned banks in Turkey still continue with their traditional 
ways of administered and subsidized loan facilities basicly for tactical purposes in 
order to gain votes. As Kardiiz has written (in Sabah, April 7th. 1994), today public 
banks in Turkey are called as "sinecures" due to their credit supplies with low 
interest-rates in return (26).
In sum, privatization in France aimed at two issues, commercialization and right- 
valuation (27). While the selling o f nationalized industries hardly created a popular 
capitalism, it might be argued that, the asset sales at least provided significant 
revenues. These revenues allowed the state to ease the private sector's tax burden 
and stimulate the economy. Still, only 20 o f the firms were privatized by 1992 out 
of the initial estimation of 60 since 1985, when the government of Chirac started 
privatization policies.
Yet, there are some lessons that can be drawn from French privatization for Turkey. 
What is striking about the privatization in France is that, in a semi-presidential 
system in which the rights o f the president is much broader, F.Mitterand seemed 
not to resist privatization although he was a strong supporter of nationalization 
movement before. Hence, it can be stated that, the efforts were neither ideological 
nor were there real conflicts among the interested parties. It was mostly a pragmatic 
and concerted effort that is why it worked even if France was a latecomer in 
privatization, whereas in Turkey coming to a consensus even among governing
parties has been nearly impossible.
3) Privatization in England : The Model of Popular Capitalism
The UK experience represents the most radical attempt for dismantling the PEs 
within a democratic environment so far (Oni§, 1991, p.236). As a result this 
experiment has attracted widespread international attention. "Successful 
privatizations" are usually taken as divestitures due to this experience. (Heald, 1988, 
p.69). Therefore, Thatcher government is widely admired overseas for her 
determined reduction o f the number of enterpnses through privatization. In countries 
which were formerly part of the Commonwealth and which have maintained cultural 
links with UK, there has been a large amount of straightforward imitation of the 
corporations and industries (28). Yet, different socio-political environments bring up 
entirely different priorities on the forefront.
When Prime Minister Thatcher was first elected in May 1979, privatization 
constituted a minor item on her policy agenda. Between 1979-83, a slow progress 
was made in order to undermine the role o f public sector. Some public assets were 
sold like Cable and Wireless (1981) and Amersham International (1982). Yet, these 
were small companies and they were already functioning in a competitive 
environment. The basic principles o f British privatization were; reducing the debts of 
public sector, diffusing ownership among people and fair distribution o f wealth. Still, 
the ultimate goal was increasing efficiency at the macroeconomic level, rather than 
those shortterm fiscal and sociopolitical aims (29). The contribution of SEEs to the 
state treasury was always lesser than the private enterpnses (Doğan, 1993. p.l27).
The prices of goods and commodities produced by the SEEs which were often 
monopolistic in nature, were always higher than those of private sector. The SEEs 
in Britain could not make their own funds, within their own organizations, so they 
borrowed from the treasury. Thus, through antitrust laws and increasing 
competition among firms, in the long run, the emphasis was given to the reduction 
of inefficiency and lack of discipline within SEEs.
The belief of the Thatcher government is that, market itself responds to the choices 
o f people more accurately than any other imposed process. This can again be traced 
back to the industrial culture of Britain, We see a more "unfettered" model of 
capitalism in England as compared to the Continental European countries. Some 
obstacles such as social welfare policies limiting the individualistic market were 
abolished. Even still, British capitalism was more defensive compared to American 
model. Meanwhile, it was also argued that, the privatization program of 
Mrs.Thatcher was driven by political objectives, rather than economic ones (Dobek, 
1993 ,p.24). According to Dobek, Thatcher government was careful about the 
electoral aspect of this policy; the expansion of social groups which were most likely 
to vote Conservative. He argued that, most of the pro-conservative strata o f British 
society were shareholders, property owners and private sector employees, who 
were in favor o f the status-quo.
Most observers agree that, the privatization program in Britain gained momentum 
during the second phase of Thatcher administration, following the general elections 
o f 1983. This is also true for the MP government in Turkey as Turgut Ozal's 
privatization implementations got speed after 1987. The sale of Bntish Telecom, 
which was a state owned telecommunications company in November 1984, formed
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the turning point of privatization in Britain. The government sold 51 percent of the 
shares of B.Telecom, Two and a quarter million applicants received shares. The 
une.xpected success of the sale of B.Telecom encouraged further privatizations. The 
first major case was the sale of British Gas. This was followed by the sale of British 
Airlines in February 1987. Rolls Royce in May 1987. By 1987, privatization gained 
further significance on government's agenda and was identified as the major success 
o f Thatcher administration. Sale of public assets was not the only method used in 
UK. Self-privatization within the company was also encouraged in several firms. For 
example, the National Freight Consortium was sold to the employees o f the 
establishment. Yet, a number of enterprises have been sold directly to private 
companies (30). The important point is that, the government sold its equity stakes in 
private companies where it did not exert any management control.
From a comparative perspective, the most striking feature o f UK privatization was 
that, it emerged as an instrument for establishing a form of "popular capitalism" 
(Öniş, 1991, p.240). It became the central element o f transforming Britain in the 
direction o f free-market economy and an individualistic society. Privatization was 
seen as the basis o f transforming attitudes, as well as creating an "enterprise culture" 
(31). In Britain, the number of shareholders increased from two million (5%) of the 
adult population prior to the sales in 1983, to 9.4 million (23.6 %) o f the adult 
population in 1987. This shows that, the government was able to incorporate a 
significant amount o f the electorate in its privatization program. To accelerate the 
momentum of privatization in order to include large numbers of small investors into 
the process, even underpricing o f public assets was used. Hence, privatization was 
seen as an outcome of both economic and political liberalism, increasing participation 
o f people both in politics and economics.
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At this point, a question comes to mind about the compatibility of the principles of 
efficiency and diffusion of capital so widely among people. Here, Vuylsteke argues 
that, the presence of a minority shareholder may increase efficiency by instilling a 
greater management autonomy (32). Moreover, developing money and capital 
markets also increase efficiency of the financial system and make the economy 
more flexible and liquid in the long-run.
Another reason which was added to the government's popularity with the electorate, 
was the considerable fiscal impact of the privatization program. Revenues from 
privatization totaled 2.3 billion pounds between 1979-83, and 10.7 billion between 
1983-87. This fiscal contribution led to a reduction in the income tax burden, which 
was one of the most important targets of pnvatization in general. However, there 
were still some public restrictions. Privatization in Britain was initiated only if the 
firm that was to be subjected to the effort would serve the national interests. To 
secure this, the British government introduced the "golden share" system (33). 
Under this procedure, an individual can not hold more than 15 percent of the shares 
o f an enterprise without the permission of the board representing the state share. 
The manager o f these firms had to be a British citizen. Through these kinds o f 
restrictions, the state established a form o f indirect control over the privatized 
organizations.
According to Heald, three particular issues were the most important characteristics 
o f the privatization program in UK (34):
• Implementation of the program by a desire for financing the existing
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expenditure/tax cuts through mechanisms reducing the public sector's real fiscal 
deficit
• Elimination o f the conflicts between denationalization and the promotion of 
competition through liberalization measures in favor of the former
• Extension of individual ownership by privatization, with the motive of "making 
everyone a capitalist", by building popular support against renationalizations, so 
that the efforts would be irreversable.
As it was backed by liberalization meaning the introduction of fair competition to the 
economic activity, privatization worked in Britain due to Thatcher's consistent 
commitment to the principles of free-market-economy.
As it was seen in Mexican, French and British experiences privatization was the 
result o f a certain amount of cohesiveness and consensus within the society and 
among the managers, which are hardly seen in Turkey. Mexico, starting divestitures 
in 1989, followed a gradual path and implemented privatization in a transparent 
manner, together with a special department responsible of the policy. France, 
being a latecomer into this particular movement is ahead of us, because there are no 
ideological confrontations and conceptual misunderstandings. England on the other 
hand, is a genuine example of creating a capitalist society. The capital was so 
successfully diffused to the people that, public opinion, media and employees were 
giving their consent to privatization, which opened the way of further divestitures to 
the British government, without constituting any major political risk. The belief of 
the Thatcher government in "market-forces" and "economic liberalism", rather than 
in the "state" as the protector o f the economic activities o f people -like in Turkey- 
seems to be the real motivator of privatization. Similar type of commitment was 
initiated with the January 24 Measures of 1980 and continued by the MP coming to
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power in 1983 in Turkey. Yet, privatization still was a long way to go due to various 
obstacles and inability of managers, as will be discussed below.
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CHAPTER TWO
PRIVATIZATiON IN Tl RKEY
A- Post 1980 Liberalization Efforts
The Motherland Party (MP) entered the Turkish political scene in 1983 after the 
military interim period, as a catch-all party. The leader of the party, Turgut Ozal, 
was a proponent of free-market economy. With a more action-oriented attitude, 
Mr.Ozal introduced and implemented many "firsts" in the Turkish economic and 
political history. The policies about privatization in particular, being a part of this 
new political party's agenda and January 24 Measures was "first" implemented in 
1984. This first pnvatization movement in Turkey started, mostly as a pragmatic 
and strategic attempt, far from being systemic. The aim of this chapter is analyzing 
the early efforts o f privatization in Turkey by looking at its positive and negative 
outcomes, in order to draw some lessons out of them.
Turkey at the end of 1979 was in an economic bottleneck. The government was 
unable to pay its debts back. There was also a serious lack of foreign exchange 
leading to shortages of many consumer goods, which was supplied by the newly 
developing black market. Parallel to these economic problems, terrorism was 
escalating rapidly because o f the polarization among both the elite and within the 
society. In May and June of 1979, TUSlAD (Turkish Industrialists and 
Businessmen's Association) started to advocate liberal economy and criticized the 
government through media. These advertisements indicated that, the private sector 
was determined to play an important role in Turkish domestic politics in the future
Following the above crisis of Import Substitution Strategy (ISI) which favored 
overvaluation of Turkish currency, the financial system had come to a halt; it was 
no longer liquid -in the sense of individual savings being transferred into 
investments- and there were no foreign currency resources. ISI has focused on 
national self sufficiency and inward-oriented development in the late 1970s (1). In 
contrast to 1970s,with MP; Turkey followed a major program of stabilization and 
deep structural adjustments, in conjunction with the IMF (Öniş and Ozmucur, 
1990,p,133). This program was basically designed to reduce the amount of state 
intervention as well as liberalizing the economy. This new approach was a substitute 
for the traditional economic policy of import substitution (which did not seek to 
internationalize the Turkish economy) in particular and etatism in general (Heper, 
1989,p.463). At this point, ISI and etatism have a close relationship in terms o f 
having the "state" at the top making the economic and industrial policies. So the 
January 24 Measures aimed at revising the economy(Özbaş,I992,p.8). Basic 
intention was stopping inflation and increasing devaluations, by bringing stability to 
the financial regime to be able to rise Turkey's creditworthiness in the international 
arena. January 24 Measures were taken by the contributions of Turgut Özal, who at 
that time was the Undersecretary For Economic Planning under Süleyman Demirel's 
prime ministry. The January 24 Measures have changed the economic policy which 
was dominant since the early days o f the Republic. This new policy mainly aimed a t :
• Opening of domestic economics to outside competition,
• Increasing im ports,
• Rolling back the state frontiers or reducing it to minimum in terms of its
(Çavdar, 1992, p 227).
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intervention in economics,
• Promotion of capital accumulafion within the private sector,
• Establishment of the conditions for free-market economy to run itself efficiently 
without interventions with its institutions of capital market, competitive banking 
system and necessary technological infrastructure.(TUSIAD, 1992, p.43).
1) Opposition Against Liberal Efforts
Two sources of opposition were faced by the government about January 24 
Measures. One was coming from those who made easy money by making stocks 
and from those dealing with the black-market. Other was coming from the left wing, 
as they believed in strong statism (state-led economy) (2). On the contrary, what 
Ozal tried to adopt was a free-market economy in which government intervention 
into the economy was reduced. January 24 Measures were made with the aim of 
bringing free competition within a certain period of time (3) While January 24 
Measures were bringing socio-economic changes, April 5 Measures seems to be 
more economic, focusing on short term goals.
2) A New Era For SEEs
After the January 24 Measures, the state was capable of promoting stability, growth 
and efficiency. These measures opened a new chapter in Turkish daily life 
emphasizing the market forces in economics and reduction o f the scope of 
bureaucracy in politics. With the decreasing role o f the bureaucratic-state, civil 
societal elements were more oftenly coming to the fore,such as the incorporation of 
business circles into decision making process. Meanwhile, inflation was decreasing
from three digit numbers in 1980 to 25 percent in 1982. Initial investigations about 
the privatization o f SEEs in Turkey, started shortly after the January 24 Measures 
which undermined the old economic policies totally (4). January 24 Measures mainly 
gave the impetus for Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI). In order to pursue 
EOl, the existing economic structures had to be adopted according to the new free- 
market economics. Within this framework, making of SEEs function parallel to the 
competition principles, became the basic goal Therefore, the reform of PEs 
constituted a central element in this new economic strategy. Yet, the magnitude of 
privatization remained restricted. The first attempt took place in 1988, eight years 
after the start of the program.
Pnce deregulation was the focal point during the initial phase o f 1980-83 PE reform. 
Throughout the pre-1980 era, SEEs were subjected to extensive price controls. The 
aim was providing subsidized inputs for the private manufacturing sector. Those 
controls in turn had resulted in chronic losses. After the introduction of price 
flexibility, SEEs started to make profit for the first time since early 1970s. SEEs 
which had a total loss of 31 billion in 1983, made a profit o f 465 billion in 1984, and 
783 billion in 1985. The general counter argument to this was that, the SEEs made 
profit since the government increased the prices of SEE products. Yet, the SEEs 
were open to both international and domestic competition which limited the 
government of MP to increase the prices of SEE goods randomly (5).
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Irmak indicated that, privatization was a part of the ideology which became 
crystallized with the September 12 policies (1992.p, 111). On the economic front, the 
military regime allowed a group of technocrats to take charge. With the backing of 
military, the stabilization measures were completed. Although the military played a 
critical role in shaping the state in post-1980 Turkey, the authonty shifted from the 
soldiers to the civilian government with the election of MP in 1983. This new 
government exercised political control over the bureaucracy. MP partisans were 
brought to critical posts in important state agencies including State Planning 
Organization (SPO) and Turkish Radio and Television (TRT). Furthermore, Mr. 
Ozal bypassed bureaucracy by creating new agencies such as Undersecretariats 
directly tied to his office as well as special funds outside o f Treasury (6).
B- Privatization by the Motherland Party
Following the military rule between 1980-83, the process of economic liberalization 
and democratic consolidation proceeded together (7). The newly elected right-of- 
center MP, under the leadership o f Turgut Ozal, showed strong commitment to 
accelerate the reform process which was initiated in 1980 by the January 24 
Measures. The government formed after the 1983 elections reflected MP's organic 
ties with the private sector emphasizing the free-market principles (Arat, 1990, p.l9). 
In terms of democratic consolidation on the other hand, the MP favored the 
flourishing of pluralism and civil society by attempting at rolling back the state 
frontiers through privatization o f SEEs. Following the British example, Turgut Ozal 
mainly aimed at making the people participate in the economic decision-making 
process in order to promote popular capitalism which would enhance the role of 
civil society and democracy.
One of the earliest measure of the MP administration was privatization which 
appeared on the policy agenda in j984. Yet, as mentioned in the first chapter, it is 
not surprising for the governments who choose privatization as a policy option to 
face some legal problems and social restrictions. To overcome these obstacles, 
Turgut Ozal used the government decrees having the force of law which 
strengthened the executive latitude of the MP. Here, the term privatization did not 
only include the sale of public sector assets, but also liberalization o f public services
(8). The origins o f the Turkish privatization program can be traced back to the 
foundation o f the bureaucratic structure of the Mass Housing and Public 
Participation Fund (PPF) , in 1984. PPF was structured in such a way that it became 
directly responsible to the Cabinet. It gained autonomy vis-à-vis other traditional 
bureaucratic institutions like SPO, the Treasury and the Central Bank. The Higher 
Supervisory Council was also excluded from the implementation o f privatization, 
which was a body responsible for evaluating the performances of SEEs. There 
was a clear division of responsibilities between the cabinet and the PPF as the two 
executive bodies for the organization of privatization. Major decisions involving the 
selection of PEs to be privatized, would be taken by the cabinet. Once a decision was 
reached, the candidates chosen for privatization were placed under the direct control 
o f the PPF. From then on, the assets would be transferred to this institution. PPF 
assumed the responsibility for management, possible rehabilitations and the mode of 
transfer to the private ownership of the concerned enterprise. During the first 
years o f MP government, the centralization of executive increasingly under the 
prime ministry, seemed to have promoted cohesiveness. In contrast the coordination 
has become increasingly difficult in matters of privatization.
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Privatization in Turkey did not directly start as the divestiture of big companies. It 
was initiated as gradual, strategic and pragmatic policy by the Turgut Ozal 
government. As Pfefferman had observed, as long as the proposed privatization 
program was devoid of specific targets and operational details, the concept would be 
more easily accepted by political groups of many different persuasions (9). A 
pragmatic rather than an ideological approach escapes some problems in the short 
run in terms of avoiding conflicts in the society and among politicians in general, like 
the MP government did after 1984. Still, this does not mean to deny the need for a 
framework, but practical, creative and flexible trial and error approaches respond 
more to the unique characteristics o f countries and of differept enterprises. As noted 
above, the statutory decrees have given Turgut Ozal this kind of flexibility (10).
1) Early Efforts of Privatization
a) Revenue-Sharing Certificates:
The preliminary stage o f privatization in Turkey was the introduction of revenue­
sharing certificates (RSCs). The underlying motive for the introduction of RSCs 
was enabling the people to have a share in the operating revenues of some SEEs. 
Those SEEs mainly engaged in infrastructure such as communications, energy and 
transportation. Yet, the first RSCs which were made available in December 1983 
was not privatization in its real sense as it did not lead to the actual transfer of public 
assets to private companies or individuals. The first instance of RSCs included the 
revenues of the first Bosphorus Bridge, the sales of which were organized by 
commercial banks on a nationwide basis. The initial response encouraged the 
government, since the certificates were sold within hours. This made the MP to 
issue the law 2983, which opened the way to the transfer o f the management rights 
of SEEs as well as the sale of SEEs through public offering (11). The government
proceeded with the issuing of the certificates of Keban Dam and Hydroelectric 
Power Station in January 1985. The experience with the new RSCs was instructive 
for the government, as it showed the high demand for such assets by the public. 
This experience provided the signal to the MP to carry on privatization, while it was 
a public learning eflfort as well as a take-off' for the government.
b) Search for a Master Plan and Strategy :
The MP government in 1985 wanted the proposals of two American firms, Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York and The First Boston Corporation, as well 
as the three British firms; Lazard Brothers and Co. LTD., Chase Manhattan Ltd., and 
Morgan Frenwell And Co. Ltd. . After the negotiations, an arrangement was signed 
between the SPO and Morgan Trust of New York in the same year. The 
government requested the Morgan Bank to make up a master plan for privatization. 
The criterion in the selection of enterprises was their salability, their market potential 
and profitability. The bank submitted its report in May 1986, identifying the 
companies which were suitable for privatization. In their master plan, Morgan 
Guaranty indicated th a t;
"... according to our final decision, there is no serious obstacle for starting 
the privatization program. Some of the SEE may need limited structural 
changes, but we believe that the government will appoint some fiscal 
advisors for the sale of some parts of USA§ (Turkish Airplane Industry 
Company), THY (Turkish Air Lines), TURBAN(a chain of state owned 
hotels), (^iTOSAJM and YEMSAN (two companies engaged in the 
manufacturing of cement and animal seed respectively) within two years 
(TUSiAD, 1993,p.58).
This master plan showed the planning and sequencing intentions of MP as part of 
their strategic sales. Although the ground for privatization was prepared during 
1987, still the MP government was reluctant about the implementation, due to the 
large opposition coming both from the business community and from the social 
democrats. Consequently MP waited until they obtained a consent for their broad 
economic program in the general elections of November 1987. In the second term 
o f Ozal administration, privatization emerged as a dominant theme.
c) Why did the First Success Story Turn into a Failure ?
In Turkey, the first major case of privatization occurred in 1988. This was the sale 
of a telecommunications company, Teletaş. The choice of Teletaş was inspired by 
the successful examples o f British Telecom and British Gas. Following the operation, 
Teletaş was divided into 40.000 shareholders. Originally, 40 percent o f the 
company's shares were owned by the state. In February 1988, the government 
made available o f its 40 percent shares to the public (TKKOI, 1994, p.6). At the end 
o f the sale, 15.4 billion TL was obtained. Consequently, Teletaş became the 
company with the largest number o f shareholders in Turkey. According to TKKOI 
(Mass Housing Public Participation Institution), Teletaş was a good example as they 
argued that, diffusion of ownership and capital was created, which was one of the 
most important socioeconomic goals o f privatization (12). But the evidence showed 
that, the performance of the company , in Istanbul Stock Exchange , failed to answer 
the initial optimism. The value of the Teletaş shares declined from an initial value of 
5000 TL. per unit to 3000 TL. by the end of 1988 (13). The performance of the 
Teletaş shares showed the fact that, the Turkish capital market was not 
sophisticated enough for a major transfer operation (14). Part o f the blame was 
attributed to the bad timing of the policy makers. The sales were made during the
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restabilization attempts of the government under high levels of inflation,
d) Search for Alternative Modes :
Because of the failure of Teletaş, government's attention was shifted to alternative 
modes of privatization. This involved the direct sale of state assets to private firms. 
Although the domestic business community accepted privatization in principle, 
domestic corporations failed to emerge as serious candidates within the process. 
Hence, the government turned its attention to foreign investors which would offer 
better opportunities in technological transfer. During the final months of 1988, a 
new wave of privatization emerged in Turkey. ÇİTOSAN (Turkish Cement 
Industry) was sold to French Société Français which was nulled by Council of State 
( 15). This was followed by the sale of 70 percent of USAŞ shares to Scandinavian 
Airlines (16). Boğaziçi Airlines was also sold to a consortium including Irish Airlines. 
So in 1989, the government displayed a firm commitment to privatization, based on 
the participation o f foreign investors. In these terms SÜMERBANK ( the largest 
SEE majorly involved in textile manufacturing ) and PETKİM ( a company engaged 
in the production of petroleum products) were identified as the major candidates. 
Their sale to foreign capital formed the heart of the opposition directed against MP.
C- Opposition Against the Block -Sales to Foreigners
The privatization program based on foreign investments faced political opposition 
both from labor and private business. Once PETKIM and SUMERBANK placed 
within the privatization agenda, this opposition increased. As far as PETKlM was 
concerned, the idea was challenged on the grounds that, PETKIM was located in a
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strategic sector and its transfer into foreign hands would be against national interest. 
Meanwhile, SÜMERBANK was regarded as the most well-konwn and widespread, 
profitable institution Qf the public sector. TUSİAD, representing the interests of 
corporate business became the voice of opposition of the sales to foreign investors. 
In fact, today, with the exception of the marginal parties, all the political parties along 
the political spectrum seems to accept the privatization in principle. The point of 
differentiation is about the extent, timing and means of privatization.
Having different approaches to privatization, the opposition parties of SDPP, TPP 
and Prosperity Party (PP), opposed to MP itself, rather than the privatization 
programs (17). SDPP even called for the renationalization o f the enterprises which 
were already privatized by the MP government, SDPP attacks on MP mainly 
focused on the points of: the sales to foreign investors, sale of the profiting SEEs 
rather than the loss making ones, and the undervaluation in sales. Irmak concluded 
that, as the privatized assets were not being sold to domestic firms, the sales were 
serving to the interests o f foreigners (18). Cevdet Selvi, the SDPP Member of 
Parliament from Eskişehir made the below comment at Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA) during the investigation on the privatization of SEEs, which was 
initiated by SDPP :
" Whose property is sold to whom and how? It is very dangerous for 
Turkey to open the way to domestic and foreign monopolies to be 
powerful in such a way that, they will lead our economy totally in the 
future (DPT, 1993,p.99)."
The sale o f ÇİTOSAN in particular caused many problems to the MP government.
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Five factories of ÇİTOSAN including the Balıkesir, Trakya, Ankara, Söke and Afyon 
divisions were sold to the Société Des Çiments Français (SCF) m 1989 (19). The 
prerequisite to this sale on the side of Turkish Fligher Planning Council (FIPC) was 
that, 40 percent of the shares which were to be transferred to SCF would be 
offered to the public and employees of these departments within a five year period. 
After the approval of HPC, the shares were given to the new-owner SCF. Still, 
problems continued. This execution was opposed on the grounds that, sales to 
foreigners was not seiwing to the goals of privatization in Turkey, together with its 
contradiction to the Constitution. Consequently, in the same year, the sales were 
blocked by the Council of State. Thus, the restriction of the sale of ÇİTOSAN to 
SCF was resulted in a loss of trust both in foreign and domestic firms. 
Internationally , the foreign capital was forced to be reluctant and slow in their 
investments into Turkish public sector. Domestically, the conflicts between the 
Executive and Constitutional Court was started, which would last until today.
These political constraints proved themselves by a major setback of MP in the local 
government elections of March 1989. From then on, opposition parties drew 
attention to the fact that, the government lacked popular mandate to carry on their 
privatization policies. On the point o f social support, most o f the opposition came 
from the TPP. According to Süleyman Demirel, who was the leader of TPP, it is not 
enough for a government to be sure about the benefits o f the sale o f state assets. 
The most important point to him was, persuading the people in order to get their 
consent. Still, at the end of 1989, MP continued with privatization programs.
The Turkish privatization constitutes an example of elite-engineered social reform 
which was not backed up from below (20) The impetus and implementation 
originated within the government as a highly centralized process insulated from 
outside pressures and feedback. The steps towards privatization included the 
creation of a new bureaucratic structure, which became independent from other 
layers of traditional bureaucracy. The Ozal government aimed at instituting a 
Thatcher style popular capitalism. The introduction o f RSCs and Teleta§ experience 
of 1988 were designed to accelerate the participation of small investors on a 
nationwide scale. It was clear that, the development of the capital market was crucial 
for the project of the creation o f popular capitalism to succeed. The MP hoped that 
the sale of public assets would contribute to the development o f a capital market, 
which in turn would open the way to further privatizations. That is why the 
attempts to create a capital market was parallel to the attempts of privatization.
D- Concluding Remarks
An important lesson to be drawn from the MP experiment is that, privatization 
becomes politically unattractive when it is primarily directed towards foreign 
investors. At a time o f increasing foreign external debts, Ozal-govemment was 
interested in the participation o f foreign firms as a means o f attracting foreign 
capital, technology and management efforts. However, this undermined the 
government's political power as labor and business opposed to privatization. 
Although one of the basic intentions of privatization was bringing civil-societal 
elements to the surface, the decisions were made within a centralized government 
regardless of interest groups without any transparency. The loss of trust to Turgut 
Ozal's privatization program again showed that, alternative modes of privatization
including direct sales to foreign investors was in most cases far from being 
politically attractive.
The 1983 election indicated that, MP was a devotee of free-market economics 
emphasizing the need to bring Turkey into the international competitive marketplace. 
This initial appeal under Ozal's leadership to market rationality had struck a 
responsive cord with the Turkish electorate (21). MP was able to continue its status 
as the major party in 1984 and 1987 elections, but national percentage of support 
was declining which led to a major setback for MP in 1989 local-elections. The 
unsuccessful privatization efforts and loss of trust within the society was one of the 
reasons of this setback. Another reason was the climbing inflation again, which 
reached to 43.2 percent in 1985 (22). The year 1987 corresponds to the lifting of 
the Constitutional ban on ex-political leaders such as Süleyman Demire! and Bülent 
Ecevit. This constituted a major challenge to the MP since 1983, as competition once 
again started at the polls. The Constitutional Referandum of 1987, culminating the 
competitive political system involving the ex-political leaders, signaled the departure 
o f MP from the moderate style of politics. Main competitor to MP was the TPP 
being the inheritor of Justice Party (JP) under the leadership o f S.Demirel. Mr. 
Demirel's criticisms mainly focused on the loss o f voter-support in MP and 
constitutional issues. Meanwhile, the rate o f inflation reached to 80 percent in 1989. 
Thus, the period 1987-89 experienced a mutual hardening of attitudes o f political 
parties towards each other, as well as a campaigning by the opposition parties 
against MP, criticizing every policy they execute including privatization. When the 
legal-constitutional problems and block-sales to foreigners about privatization in 
particular was added , a veiy slow progress was made towards this direction until 
1991. What is surprising about the following 49th-50th coalition governments in
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Turkey is that, they continued with the block-sales in 1990s which (especially 
S.Demirel) they had criticized before, being subjected to similar criticisms by the MP 
(under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz) this time (23).
Bringing free-market philosophy into Turkey, Özal administration intended to create 
liberal individuals participating in economic decisions, as well as creating a 
small-state. Still,the biggest contribution of Özal was in terms of changing mainly 
the atmosphere and principles about pro-active socio-economic policies. Today, 
people at all social strata discuss privatization efforts instead of solely reacting. 
Privatization, being one of the components of this new era coming after the January 
24 Measures, was to be a tool for the liberalization of public services and sale of 
public sector assets. AJthough the privatization movement during MP was backed by 
debureaucratization, the capital market and domestic firms failed to support the 
movement. Most important of all, following the hardening attitudes of political 
parties towards each other after 1987, the confrontations began lasting until today, 
which is the most difficult obstacle to overcome on our way to free market 
economics. Thus, the best suggestion at this point that can be made is creating a 
suitable environment for dialogue which can lead to the preparation o f a general 
framework for privatization, clearly defining the roles o f each part in this movement. 
The significance o f the need for a social consensus will be verified by examples in 
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRIVATIZATION IN THjE 1990s 
A- General Outlook of 1990s
In the 1990s, Turkish economy still witnessed some problems. Governments were 
unable to meet their external debts due to some internal and external reasons. 
Internally, an inflation rate of 80 percent was inherited from the second half of 
1980s, together with a small growth-rate and slow progress about privatization in 
particular.
Externally, the fiscal impact of the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis was important. Although 
Turkey stayed out of the regional conflicts by maintaining neutrality throughout 
most of the post-Second World War period, Gulf Crisis erupted at a time when 
Turkish perceptions about the restructuring o f European security were colored with 
considerable pessimism because o f the collapse of Soviet Union (Sayari, 1992,p.l0). 
Due to Ankara's anxiety about the future of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization), Turkey supported the US position during the crisis. In return, US 
promised Turkey to increase security assistance and new trade benefits as a reward. 
Still, the OSS of Turkish government was $ 5-7 billion (1) resulting in the 
suspension of investments and subsidies within the country. When the foreign debts 
were added to the situation, conditions within the public sector was worsened which 
already began to show negative signals since 1988.
As Table-1 shows, according to SPO statistics, profitability of SEEs worsened after 
1988. The rate of profitability decreased to 6 percent which was 15 percent
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YEAR PERIODICAL LOSSES OF TURKISH SEE's (in Billion TL)
1990 -920
1991 -17625
1992 -16490
Table 1) Financial índex of SEEs Regarding Profitability in Turkey (1990-1991) 
Source; DPT, 1993, p.80
between 1984-88. Basic reason for this downfall was increasing domestic and 
foreign debts (2). In 1990, the gap in balance of payments was widening. Foreign 
debts were $ 50 billion. This has put Turkey among the four countries having the 
highest level of foreign debts m the world (3). The inability of the government to 
compensate for the public expenditures by the taxes also contributed to this rise. In 
this context, it was accepted that, public sector deficits would reach 27 trillion TL. at 
the end of 1991.
B- The New Government and Reform Process
TPP and SDPP as a coalition came to power with the 1991 elections replacing the 
MP. This new coalition government aimed at structuring the institutional and 
material basis for Turkey's industrialization within a two-year stability program 
(Boratav and Tiirkcan, 1993, p.260). First thing to be done was reducing inflation to 
an acceptable level which the MP government failed in.
Within the program of the new coalition government, problems of Turkish SEEs 
and privatization still carried weight. During the administration of 49th government 
under Demirel, the sales o f public sector and state enterprises' shares continued, 
together with the introduction o f a new "SEE reform" as a part of the industrial 
strategies. Yet, the success o f the SEE reform was dependent on the success o f the 
whole program (Atasoy, 1993,p.232). In reducing inflation, the coalition government 
was not only motivated by increasing competition in economics, but by establishing 
the principles of rationality in public sector as well. The SEE reform was seen as an 
instrument which would integrate Turkey into the globalized world economics.
The reform was initially based on the principle of a restructuring m management in 
order to increase efficiency and profitability. This reform being strategic at this 
moment, also introduced other goals like giving autonomy to the PEs to free them 
from political and bureaucratic interventions. The aim was the creation of a 
"professional management". Although privatization of ownership is important, the 
privatization of management is also essential. This brings us to the point of giving 
autonomy to the PEs. One of the main reasons for the failure of SEEs was political 
interference in the enterprise-administration. Thus, giving autonomy to the SEEs had 
to be underlined together with a strong supervising mechanism in order to maintain 
continuity. That way the power and responsibilities of the autonomous 
institution will not be much different from a well functioning firm in the private 
sector. An autonomous PE can appoint its own managers and if there is need, it can 
then make arrangements about ownership.
In the restructuring process of the 49th government in Turkey, the lowest common 
denominator for the TPP and SDPP wing on privatization was the principle of 
"autonomy". Especially SDPP, always being reluctant about privatization, agreed on 
first giving autonomy to the SEEs and then privatizing them. Accordingly, 
privatization should be used to increase efficiency and competition, rather than with 
the only initiative o f changing ownership whatever the costs would be (4). Social 
democrats' agreement is that, during privatization the priority must be given to the 
needs and opportunities of the enterprise, rather than imposition from outside. That 
way, the restructuring o f SEEs will happen without creating a burden on the state 
treasury. Having debated and agreed on these points, the first government protocol 
regarding the economy was formed, without any divergencies.
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On December 20th of 1991 , all the power and responsibilities about privatization 
was given to PPF together with the transformation of all shares of the state. In 
1992, while making decisions about policies like, closure, transformation, 
privatization, or about unification of PEs, it was accepted that, an autonomous 
institution had to be established, which later was called as TO YÖK (Institution of 
Turkish Autonomy Restructuring and Pnvatization). The coalition was trying to 
prepare the necessary legal background in order to implement its reforms. 
Privatization in particular was to be regulated and implemented by the PPF, until 
TÖYÖK was legalized. The objective was providing the suitable environment in 
which SEEs could function according to the principles of efficiency, free-market 
economy and autonomy through privatization, together with the modernization of 
fiscal and administrative structures (5). The revenues coming from the SEEs would 
be partly given to TO YÖK and partly to state-treasury, later to be used in education, 
health services or other new investments.
C- Tansu Çiller's Coalition Period: Beginning of Polarization About
Privatization
The studies of SEE reform was supervised and directed by the state minister Tansu 
Çiller, after the coalition program was formed. Under the leadership of Çiller, a draft 
for the reform was prepared and the first outline was subjected to debate on the 5th 
January 1992. This draft had differed from the earlier coalition protocol, as it did not 
include any "reform" except the rapid privatization o f SEEs (6). On the 27th of May 
1992, the government decided to privatize Turkish Meat and Fish Corporation, Seed 
Industry and Turkish Milk Industry (SEK). Coalition was expecting an amount of 
4-5 trillion TL. from the sales in 1992. But even the achievement of such a small
.SI
amount seemed to be difficult. This was mainly because of concerned parties about 
privatization. Procedural and principle differences seemed to be the first obstacles. 
The coalition partners, having different perceptions and understandings of 
privatization, were facing difficulties in finding a lowest common denominator 
among themselves. Many questions aroused ; whether autonomy should be given to 
SEEs or whether the block-sales of the 50th coalition government would serve to 
the interests o f foreigners like the SDPP wings accusation agianst the TPP. When 
ideological differences and the lack of transparency in decision-making during the 
course of divestitures were added to the picture, the uneasy nature o f the coalition 
became more clear. Still , the most important point seem to be the "legislation", 
issues where both statists of the SDPP and neo-liberals of TPP were placed on 
opposite poles. While the statist lobby was emphasizing the need for preventive 
measures before privatization, liberals were committed to divestiture 
implementations whatever the cost would be. All the above mentioned points, which 
led to a slow and time-consuming pace of privatization in Turkey, will be discussed 
under separate headings during the following pages. Suffice it to say now that 
despite this polarization on surface, in principal there are no hardliners compeletely 
agaist privatization. The divergence is on issues o f sequencing, choice of firms and 
means.
1) Procedural Differences as Barriers
In order for privatization to be successful, the opposition must be at a tolerable level 
and the criticisms need to be constructive. The 50th coalition government which was 
formed under Tansu Çiller in 1993, did not achieve a consensus on privatization even 
with her partner in the coalition. TPP's emphasis is on opening up to foreign markets
by such sales, as well as increasing the export opportunities. SDPP on the other 
hand, gives priority to putting the new technology into effect and "autonomy" first 
within the existing conditions of the firms. In the first coalition protocol there was 
no divergence on this point. After the new government protocol with Çiller, 
problems came to surface about privatization. SDPP regarded that, the restructuring 
of SEEs was converted into an ideological issue by the TPP with the emphasis on 
selling-off as soon as possible, whatever the cost would be (7). SDPP emphasized 
the importance of privatization in the longrun as a means to increase the efficiency 
of the economy as a whole (8), while the TPP, especially T.Çiller was emphasizing 
only transfer of ownership from public to private hands. Social Democrats argued 
that, TÖYÖK having part in the first government protocol which included a wide 
range o f time and sequencing of privatization process was put on the shelf (9).
2) Principal Obstacles and Methodological Differences
Concerning selling SEEs to foreigners, particularly of strategic ones such as 
PETKİM and PTT, the main reason for objection on the side o f SDPP was that, it 
was against national interest and sovereignty. Social democrats argued that, the 
service and commodity production will result in the benefit o f foreign capital rather 
than domestic capital accumulation. Thus, the block-sales (10) o f SEK (Turkish Milk 
Industry) and Seed Industry was prevented by Murat Karayalçm (leader o f SDPP) 
on the 28th of October 1993. The reason was mainly undervaluation of the 
industries. To Karayalçm, the minimum prices determined for those PEs was not 
fulfilling the expectations. According to Mesut Yılmaz (leader of the main opposition 
MP) , the current sales o f state assets by T. Çiller would lead to great problems in 
2000s (Karakoyunlu, 1993, p. 177). He argued that, SDPP will use its preferences 
alon‘> with the worker class and trade unions, thus, playing a constraining role in
privatization process, emphasizing the uneasy character of the coalition (II).  
Karayalçın on the other side, many times argued that, SDPP was not against 
privatization, rather they were differing on the methods used by TPP. While Tansu 
Çiller became the ideological spokeswoman of the neo-liberal aims in her divestiture 
efforts, social democrats favored a piecemeal approach by providing remedies 
according to different needs and problems of each and every PE (12) as part of their 
statist principles.
Right wing of the coalition argued that, privatization could be used to control 
inflation. In contrast, SDPP indicated that, using the sale revenues to meet the 
budget deficit through block sales w ; against the basic principles of privatization. In 
fact, privatization allows governments to give up some procedures like "savings- 
precautions" which are difficult to fulfill because o f political and economic reasons. 
Although the basic goal is in macroeconomic terms, privatization can also be used 
for short term fiscal purposes. That is, SEEs can be sold to achieve some fiscal 
income. However as Atasoy has argued, this kind of privatization aiming at 
providing money for the government is regarded as "deceptive" by some pressure 
groups, parties and journalists, if it is continuous (1993,p.l84). Similarly, SDPP 
underlined that, the Turkish capital market is not sufficient enough to absorb the 
block sales, consequently, forcing the government to sell PEs to foreigners.
In the eyes of SDPP the concept of privatization was reduced just to a "change in 
ownership" due to the mismanagement of TPP wing. Statistics showed that, the 
most commonly used method of privatization in Turkey was block-sales. As Table-2
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shows, in 1992 only this method was used, without having public-offering, on the 
agenda (13).
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1986-91 1992 Total
Block Sales 474'890 2'558’800 3'033'690
Public Offering r09I723 0 . 1'091'723
Sale at Istanbul Stock Market 786'480 73'232 859'640
Total 2’353'021 2'632’032 4'985'053
Table 2) Revenues of Privatization in Turkey, according to methodology (Million TL) 
Source: Sabah, January 11th , 1992
P S. :
*Block-Sales include the complete sale of the to-be-privatized firm by auction or by 
bargaining to any private hands
*Public-Offering includes the sale of (complete or certain,percantage of) the shares 
o f to-be-privatized enterprise to the people at large.
As a result o f the large amount of block-sales engaged by the 50th coalition 
government as shown above, another point of difference emerged in Turkey about 
the methodology, because of the sale of most profitable SEEs such as Turkish Post 
Telegram and Telephone Agency (PTT) which is also strategically important. As the 
basic principles of privatization was diverted by TPP according to social democrats, 
profiting enterprises were placed at the top of the sale-list by Tansu Çiller. Different 
members of SDPP, several times drew attention in media to the fact that, 
bureaucrats who would speed up the sale of the enterprises were being appointed to 
the manager- offices, rather than those who would work for the restructuring of 
them in order to increase efficiency.
3) Ideological Differences
Although SDPP accepted the divestiture of state assets with some pre-conditions, 
ideologically SDPP party program is against wholesale privatization. As indicated in 
their program which was accepted on the second o f November 1983 (14), SDPP 
believes in an economy where planning overrules. They also stressed the social 
welfare policies and the significance of public services. Their program indicated that, 
industrialization, independence in foreign relations, equal income distribution and 
solution to economic problems requires a state-led development and social state. 
SDPP emphasized privatization to the extent that state plays less role in production, 
but retains its social and political functions. In this sense, it can be argued that SDPP 
is no longer as rigid as in the past regarding privatization. Today, they have a more 
flexible view on divestitures as long as the above mentioned points are taken into 
account. The debates on privatization in Turkey are still ideological about its goals, 
rather than concerning the means or the social outcomes.
In a survey about the aim of privatization, TPP representatives tended to answer in 
terms of encouraging competition and leaving market dynamics rule. This proves 
that TPP looks at privatization from an ideological stand while SDPP sees 
privatization just as a means for economic goals. Increasing productivity and 
efficiency seemed to be the most important goal among SDPP members (15). The 
argument that including foreign capital in privatization will strengthen international 
and political bonds, did not have much support among either the politicians or 
bureaucrats.
4) Lack of Transparency and Consequent Lack of Trust
According to the PPF reports, one of the main problems faced during the 
privatization process in Turkey was the lack of support coming from the public and 
media (Kök, 1993,p.l43). The reason why there is no support from below and mass 
media is the lack of transparency and consistency by the 50th government. As has 
been argued, one of the principle lessons from prior experience is that, every 
privatization transaction must be transparent (16). Transparency can be ensured 
only through clearly defined procedures, disclosure of purchase price and buyer, 
well-defined institutional responsibilities and adequate monitoring o f the program
(17). These characteristics are the missing ones in T.Çiller's implementations. 
Relatedly, it is hard to talk about a trust on the part o f society and other politicians. 
Recently, privatization decisions are still been taken behind closed doors as the 
government was in a rush, willing to create swift -privatization without informing 
the public and taking precautions. The general complaints focusing on issues like, 
underpricing, sales to foreigners and block-sales are all results of Tansu Çiller's 
effort to speed up the process. This is giving birth to a feeling of distrust among 
different strata including the mass-media, public-opinion and politicans as well.
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Overall, this lack o f transparency has led to a perception of unfair bargaining terms, 
which have higher costs than benefits.
For the sake of speeding up the process of pnvatization, the principles of diflfijsing 
ownership and capital to people in order to prevent monopolies and inequalities in 
income distribution, has been put in serious danger. Similarly, the advisor of T.Çiller 
(when she was the minister of state responsible o f privatization) Özer Ertuna 
indicated th a t :
"...the main handicap that the society will face because of privatization 
will be the inequalities in income distribution, as the rich will become 
richer and the poor will become poorer (Özgıda İş, 1992, p.84)".
On the 6th November 1993, Mümtaz Soysal (Ankara deputy of SDPP and recent 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) wrote in Hürriyet that, the waste o f the government 
about selling the SEEs is basically because of the expected amount of the budget 
deficit in 1994, which is 194 trillion TL.. He further argued that the idea of 
rehabilitation of SEEs was put aside because o f the panic of selling them rapidly. 
The particular sale of Telecommunications division o f PTT (hereafter cited as "T" of 
PTT) (18) was regarded as paying lip service to foreigners. In an environment in 
which public enterpreneurship is corrupt, the solution seems to be changing the 
managers and giving autonomy, rather than the sale o f those enterprises.
Tansu Çiller also lost the support o f the media due to the lack o f transparency. 
Media generally regarded Çiller's privatization measures as "selling the public 
property by auction". Media is against the idea of selling PEs when the government
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is in need of money. A sale which occupied an important space within the debates of 
privatization in Turkey was the "T" of P'fT. Many journalists and TV, oppose the 
sale of "T" as after the sale neither the ownership nor the management will change. 
In Hürriyet on October 13th 1993, Enis Berberoğlu wrote that; "privatization will not 
mean anything as long as the existing managers are not fired". It seems that, the sale 
of holding-companies to only one private firm will not promote competitiveness, 
which is one of the most important principles o f pnvatization. In order to prevent 
formation of "private-monopolies", the existing administrative system of the PEs can 
be rationalized by bringing non-partisan managers to the office.
5) Statism vs Neo-Liberalism Regarding Legislation
About legislation, ideological confrontations between the statist lobby, including the 
members of SDPP -mainly Mümtaz Soysal-, Constitutional Court, civil-societal 
elements like TUSİAD and TİSK (Turkish Employers Union Corporation) and the 
liberals; including TPP members headed by T. Çiller continued. The statist lobby 
insisted on preventive cures and pre-requisites in order not to face negative social 
outcomes like strikes and unemployment, while the liberals were committed to 
divestiture by all means. This confrontation was resulted in a deadlock regarding the 
privatization efforts during the last two years.
The particular sale o f the "T" o f PTT is a good example o f the above mentioned 
struggle. On the 1st October 1993, TPP prepared a government decree having the 
force o f law about the sale o f "T" , but it was refused by the Constitutional Court. 
The sale was stopped as the Ankara member of the parliament of SDPP Mümtaz 
Soysal and 91 other representatives (among social democrats as well as from other 
parties sharing the statist view) appealed to the Constitutional Court to block the sale
of "T". The aim was passing the law restricting the issuance of stay orders 
(yürütmeyi durdurma) about the authorization bill on privatization. Hence, the TPP 
wing o f the coalition decided to propose a new bill for this particular sale. An 
economic commission consisting of PPF, SPO, Undersecretariat of Treasury and 
Foreign Trade and Ministry o f Transportation members started their works on the 
10th October 1993. To defend their arguments , the TPP indicated that the sale of 
"T" of PTT was a must, as during the Customs Union due to 1995, the EC would 
insist on the abolishment of every kind of limitations in Telecommunications. On the 
other hand, the statist opponents argued that, the EC would not accept the sale of 
"T" to one company as pnvatization.
The above mentioned conflict between the two poles was again an outcome of the 
uneasiness of the coalition by definition, and of the insistence of Tansu Çiller's 
"personalized" type of execution, which became increasingly overt after the April 5 
Measures.
D- An overview of Privatization in Turkey: The Regulatory Framework
Although privatization has been attempted in Turkey since 1986, there is no existing 
related law to coordinate and supervise the activities. None of the parties having seat 
in the Turkish Parliament is against the idea of privatization, but still a consensus has 
not been reached, which would turn into a particular law. The-lack Of such a broad 
legal framework in fact is the combination of all obstacles mentioned above which
^need to be abolished. Since Turgut Özal's initiation only the statutory decrees 
enabled the governments to engage in privatization. Similar methods are being used 
today by Tansu Çiller with more hindrances.
The first legal document related with privatization was the Law No.: 2983 on the 
Encouragement o f the Savings and Acceleration of Public Investments, which was 
issued on 17th March 1984. The main objective of the law was the making of the 
public investments in an accelerated manner via new financial resources which will 
be obtained through encouraging savings by paying stable and reliable income 
(Doğan, 1993, p. 177). It was argued that, the spirit o f this law was consistent with 
the overall policies of MP (19). The aim was reducing the scope of state 
intervention by directing the state on infrastructual activities. Second legal document 
related to the PEs was the Statutory Decree- 233, issued on the 18th of June, 1984. 
Aim was giving autonomy to the PEs in order to work them in a competitive 
environment. In 1985, Law No.; 3291, covered wide range of issues including the 
changes and amendments in the Law o f Banks, the Law of Central Bank and The 
Law o f the Capital Market, was no clear definition o f "privatization" (20). While it 
was organizing the sale of the shares o f PEs and transfer o f the operation rights o f 
PEs, it did not deal with whom to sell, valuation in the sales and socio-political 
implications o f privatization.
During 1991 and 1992, there were four different provisions and legislation on the 
decision making about privatization. These were Law No: 3701 and statutory 
decrees of 437, 470 and 473. Today, while SPO decides on which PEEs should be 
privatized and transferred to the PPF, Public Participation Supreme Board decides on 
the methods that will be used during the course o f privatization.-=As mentioned
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.ahpv&, the statutory decrees prepared by the 50th coalition-government headed by 
Tansu Çiller for the sale of "T" of PTT in 1993, and the authonzation bill on 
privatization was blocked by the Constitutional Court in 1994. The absence of a 
general legal framework for the application of divestitures, still causes problems and 
slows down the pace of privatization in Turkey. On top of this, increasing budgetary 
constraints has placed the governments at the crossroads, the longterm goal of 
efFieciency has been mostly overlooked in the debates and procedures of 
privatization.
E- World Bank Assistance: What are the Strings Attached?
Besides all the differences among the coalition partners and legal obstacles, SDPP- 
TPP coalition is continuing its privatization program. The expected inflow by PPF in 
1994 for privatization is $ 2.6 billion. Turkey, having adopted statism since the 
1930s and having this policy as a principle written in its constitution, is likely to face 
some economic and social problems caused by the privatization movement. One o f 
the negative socioeconomic outcome is related to unemployment. During their 
implementation, the coalition announced in the mass media that, they were going to 
take some measures against unemployment created by the sale of SEEs. On the 5th 
of January 1994, minister o f state Cemil Erhan said that, the unemployed personnel 
would be transferred to other public institutions. At the end of this transfer, if the 
new wages were determined lower than the previous ones; the gap would be filled 
by paying compensation and indemnity to the employees. This particular transfer 
was said to be made in 45 days.
As the government was in need of cash, in 1994 February, the coalition decided to 
cooperate with the World Bank on privatization (21). The meetings began on 23rd 
of February in Washington. After the meeting a financial support was expected to 
start. The amount was determined to be $ 100 million by the WB. The "social- 
security network" which was to be structured for the implementation of 
privatization was at the heart of the debates. The aim was being able to bring some 
alternatives to the workers who will lose their jobs. At this point, the transfers to 
other SEEs , providing capital for individual jobs and providing new or additional 
education to enable workers in other sectors, seemed to be the basic alternatives. 
However, due to the slow progress of privatization in Turkey because o f legal 
obstacles basically, WB suspended its aid program until new legal regulations and 
structural adjustments are made (22).
F- Concluding Remarks
Privatization taking part in the global agenda for the first time seemed to be more 
ideological rather than scientific (Buğra, 1993, p.20). The only thing to be done was 
putting it into effect with a decisive policy. Then, it was understood that, different 
societies are in need o f different priorities together with various difficulties during 
this process. Privatization is affecting divergent interests as socioeconomic 
conditions come to fore in determining the success of the movement. As far as 
Turkey is concerned, these various interests and beliefs showed themselves as 
confrontations between liberals and statists, systemic and pragmatic approaches and 
political parties together with different interests/pressure groups. Out of this picture, 
speaking in terms of methods o f privatization what is obvious is the low 
possibility o f diffusing capital and ownership as well as stopping inequalities in
('>2
income distribution through block sales. It seems that, not only expanding the capital, 
but also preventing the monopolies will not be possible. When the lack of consensus 
in society as well as among politicians is added to this, privatization has caused 
problems and further divisions, rather than making Turkey more competitive and 
cohesive.
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CHAPTER FOL K
CONCLUSION
A- Evaluation of Comparisons
As mentioned in the first chapter, although the history o f the privatization in Turkey 
is short, it was one o f the most important aspects of Turkish political and economic 
scene, since it entered the agenda with the Motherland Party. In Turkey, SEEs today 
are seen as burdens on the national economy, causing many problems from budget 
deficits to patron-client relationships. When privatization is limited to the sale of state 
assets, then it will not be wrong to argue that the real aim of privatization which is 
the shift to free-market economics based on competition, cannot be fulfilled. 
Especially during the TPP-SDPP coalition period, minimizing the state's involvement 
in economics is kept synonymous to reducing the debts of the public sector.
Reducing the role of state in economics was most successfully managed in England, 
where a "popular capitalism " was created. Unlike Turkey, in Britain, privatization 
was not limited only to the sale o f state assets to close fiscal gaps in the form of 
block-sales , rather it was used as a means for the transition to free market 
economics. By a true commitment to the principles o f this "Free-Market" with the 
Thatcher government England was able to receive large amounts of income through 
both sales and public-offerings. Thus, privatization in England is seen as an 
exemplary model for other countries. The precondition for such a model was 
mainly a developed capital market, which most LDCs lack. What made British 
privatization so strong was the fair distribution of wealth and capital among people
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together with the increase in efficiency at the macroeconomics level. Through 
"making every'one a capitalist", Thatcher administration has built a popular support 
against renationalizations and oppositions.
Another country which was able to create a popular support for its divestiture 
implementations was Mexico. Although limited divestiture has been taken place in 
Latin America and other LDCs, Mexican privatization seems to be an important 
example for Turkey in terms of its transparent and sequenced policies. Starting in 
1983, Mexican privatization movement was limited with small scale enterprises 
initially. Even in the extensive privatization period, unlike what the 50th coalition 
government did in Turkey, the priority was given to small and medium sized firms 
in Mexico. When this was backed up by a transparent administration by the 
informing of public and media together with the usage of dept-equity swaps within 
their structural adjustment program, Mexico reduced the danger of the sensitive 
issue o f foreign ownership. Privatization in Mexico was neither personalized nor 
behind closed doors regarding divestiture decisions and preparations.
What is unusual about France in terms of EC countries is their latecoming into the 
privatization movement. In 1986 when Jacques Chirac came to power, 
Conservatives passed a law which authorized the denationalization of some 66 firms. 
The initial motivator for privatization in France was fiscal inflows. Yet, these inflows 
would not be used to meet solely the budget deficits like in Turkey, rather would 
allow the French government to cut taxes, so that the profit margins would rise and 
further investments could be made. Jacques Chirac's program for the privatizations 
of the state-owned banking sector was also valuable since making the financial 
system solvent is an important precondition for the efficiency of the whole economy.
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While state owned banks in Turkey continue their subsidized loan facilities, state 
was being withdrawn from the national economy in France. Being pragmatic and 
free o f ideological confrontations, pnvatization worked well in France even if they 
were a latecomer.
Both MP under the leadership of Turgut Özal and today's coalition under Tansu 
Çiller are committed to the liberalization of the Turkish economy. Turgut Özal being 
the Undersecretary of Economic Planning under Süleyman Demirel's prime ministry, 
reduced the role o f state in economics as well as liberalizing it. Waterbury argued 
that, since the early 1980s Turkey has fairly and successfully pursued an economic 
strategy o f export-led growth (1991,p. 127). In a similar way, Tansu Çiller proved 
her dedication as shown here .
" ...The restructuring program o f Turkey. .. aiming both to increase its 
productivity to attain sustainable growth and to make more responsibility
in the globalization process.... The main target is to reduce the
government's role in the economy and more towards greater reliance on 
market forces. In this context, privatization programs have top priority 
on our economic agenda (1993,p.6)"
The products o f these commitments were the January 24 in 1980 and April 5, 1994 
Measures. Although there are similarities, it would be wrong to suggest that the 
history is actually repeating itself The Stability package of January 24,1980, 
involved a major deregulation of the economy in response to a disastrous balance of 
payments situation, while the April 5 1994 Measures involved no such longterm 
structural change except for some remedies like the new tax-system.
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April 5 Measures were mainly designed to counter huge public deficits as much as 
overcoming the external payments bottleneck in the short-ain. Since 1985, all the 
incomes in Turkey were used to compensate the debts, capital and interest 
payments. Parallel to this line of thinking , about the April 5 Austerity Measures 
Tansu Çiller and her junior coalition partner Murat Karayalçm said in a press - 
conference of the same day that, the most important problem Turkey facing was the 
growing public deficits. So the government was expecting an amount of $3.5 billion 
until the end of 1994 from the sales of PETKİM (Turkish Petrochemical 
Corporation), Deniz Transportation Corporation, TTY (Turkish Air Lines) and 
Turkish Petroleum, In addition to this, ТЕК (Turkish Electricity Cooperation) and 
Telecommunications Division o f Turkish Post Telegram and Telephone was to be 
privatized until the end of 1995.
When Süleyman Demirel was the head o f coalition, same method o f using 
privatization to close public sector deficits was used. In an interview published in 
Milliyet on January 4, ex-prime minister Demirel said that, privatization receipts 
would help him break out o f the budgetary restraints imposed by huge debt service 
burden (Mango, 1993, p.28). Demirel expected privatization to proceed to an amount 
of 20 trillion TL. in 1993, but this expectation was a little unrealistic. The reason was 
the sales in 1992 could only reach to 5 trillion TL.. In the light of this evidence, it can 
be concluded that, January 24 Measures were taken to restructure the dominant 
centralist policies of Turkey by opening the domestic economics to outside 
competition. April 5 on the other hand, are shortterm austerity measures in character 
and taken to' improve the existing free-market economy in Turkey which was 
heavily deteriorated by high levels of inflation and budget deficits. On the other hand, 
April 5 Measures included a tax-reform package which we do not see in January 24
decisions. A drastic devaluation was seen shortly after the recent austerity measures , 
while it came together within the package in 1980.
Privatization in particular started shortly after the January 24 Measures being a 
component of the new philosophy of export-onentation in Turkey. It was one of the 
five most important dimensions of Turgut Ozal's restructunng program, including 
the other four o f Liberalization, Deregulation, Decentralization and 
Debureaucratization, Teleta§ being the first major attempt o f privatization under Ozal 
proved to be inefficient in 1988. Teleta§ Communications has turned out to be 
bankrupt after six years o f private management. It was dragged into a crisis as it 
insisted on financing activities through private borrowing while its claims against the 
PTT remained unpaid. The unsuccessful experience of Teleta§, forced the MP 
government to engage in sales to foreigners as an alternative way. But increasing 
opposition based on the concepts like national sovereignty lead us to the conclusion 
that, direct sales to foreign investors without making the necessary pre-adjustments, 
is not a valid policy option for Turkey. On the contrary, in European context, neither 
"natural monopolies" particularly in strategic nature were placed on the sale-list, nor 
were they sold through block-sales.
As mentioned earlier, one o f the most important goal of the sociopolitical aspect o f 
privatization is the diffusion of capital. The best example constituted at this point is 
in England, where "making everyone capitalist" was successfully created through 
economic participation by the people. When we come to Turkey on the other hand, 
we see that neither the privatization movements o f MP, nor of TPP-SDPP coalition 
managed to do so. Although the initial interest to public shares was great during 
Turgut Ozal, the people changed their minds later as the value of the bonds rapidly
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decreased due to the inefficiency of the Turkish capital market. Similarly, during 
Demirel's and Çiller's periods, as the priority in terms oF divestiture method was 
block-sales, only foreign investors and large domestic companies were able to use 
state property. Especially in 1992, the block-sales reached its peak. Another 
conclusion regarding privatization efforts of the two mentioned governments is that, 
the danger of creating monopolies is still valid in Turkey. This seems to be an 
important divergence from the basic principles of privatization.
When we look at the preparation phases of privatization in Turkey, whether it is 
strategic or ideological, both Turgut Ozal and Tansu Çiller faced similar problems in 
terms of providing legal and institutional framework for this particular policy. Both 
used statutory decrees to put privatization into action. Similarly they both placed 
their own members in government structures. Turgut Özal created the bureaucratic 
organization of Public Participation Fund (PPF), which was directly responsible to 
him in 1984. Tansu Çiller on the other hand, felt the need to create an autonomous 
institution to carry out privatization. The institution of the Turkish Autonomy 
Restructuring and Privatization (TÖYÖK) was the outcome. Four days after the 
disclosing o f the bitter austerity program, the prime minister reshuffled her top 
economic bureaucrats as a part of plans to restructure the entire economic decision 
making mechanism.
Being an elite formulated movement, privatization in Turkey is initiated and still 
progressing in an insulated fashion without transparency, reflecting more of the 
personal wishes of leaders, regardless o f civil-societal inputs. Although there was a 
certain amount of cohesiveness during MP period, both business circles and labor 
unions are extremely uncomfortable with the policies of today's coalition
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government. For example KOÇ (one of the leading holdings in Turkey) many times 
suggested that, the government should consult the pressure groups such as 
employers and trade unions about the policies to be implemented. The most 
outstanding group of course is the TUSİAD. In every opportunity, they presented 
their complaints about the economic policies of the coalition. Keeping the lack of 
consensus among the coalition partners on many points in mind, it was argued that, 
the relationship of the coalition appeared to have been strengthened as they found a 
common enemy in TUSİAD and the business community (Briefing-May 9 . 1994, p,
4). It seems that Tansu Çiller has burnt all bridges with TUSİAD and risked some 
media backing about her measures including privatization. Çiller also turned her back 
on any possible cooperation with Mesut Yılmaz. Taking all the responsibility on her 
own shoulders, Çiller's and her party's future depends more on the success to be 
recorded on the part of present government.
To achieve large amounts o f income in a short time, large enterprises have to be 
sold, ceteris paribus. This is what the coalition government attempted by trying to 
sell PETKİM and SUMERBANK. T.Çiller in particular also wanted to do this in a 
very short time period under "swift privatization" as Turkey is in need o f immediate 
cash. When privatization is limited to a very short time scale together with the sale 
o f large enterprises, than the government also had to handle big problems which can 
not be held constant in a short time. This reduces the performance of the movement 
and criticisms begins to come from everywhere, even from the coalition partners 
themselves. Workers, managers, labor unions, political scientists, journalists, 
businessmen and opposition parties in the parliament, heavily blamed Tansu Çiller 
for behaving independently and for giving Turkish sovereignty into private hands.
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B- Concluding Remarks
Still the most important obstacle in Turkey is the lack of agreement in implementing 
policies, be it privatization or any other related matter, among the political parties and 
the coalition itself The coalition partners of the government neither try to find 
common ways among themselves, nor with other parties. Rather, Tansu Çiller used 
her preferences along with personalizing the privatization movement. Contrary to 
the French and Mexican examples mentioned before, privatization in Turkey in 
1990s has been pursued under hot debates on ideological differences behind closed 
doors. Acting exclusively. Çiller moves in an over-optimistic manner. Mesut Yılmaz 
on the other hand, behaves as over-pessimistic as the major opposition party, saying 
that the true reason behind the economic crisis was the Çiller administration's 
mismanagement, without taking any responsibility of the past economic problems 
caused by the MP since 1987 (Bekdil, 1994, p.21).
For nearly one year with Tansu Çiller as prime minister, the coalition government 
has been suffering serious setbacks mainly because o f the continuing terrorism and 
skyrocketing inflation. Unfortunately, in neither o f above essential issues, has the 
coalition been able to come up with constructive measures so far. This was because 
o f the lack of consensus or lack o f any constructive criticism in general. The last 
instance was that, the authorization bill on privatization which would allow Tansu 
Çiller to issue statutory decrees about the amendment of 45 laws, was rejected by 
the Constitutional Court due to the appeal of MP for preventing the issuance of 
stayorders about privatization, on the 5th June 1994.
Being the prime mover of economic-liberalism, Turgut Özal initiated privatization
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with the January 24 Measures in Turkey Although a popular capitalism, which was 
the most important outcome of British-privatization, could not be created, the efforts 
of MP was valuable in terms of bringing economic rationality and proactive policies 
instead of hands-off policies. Major attempts of Turgut Ozal proved to be 
unsuccessful due to the large scale sales to foreigners, which in turn was 
subjected to heavy criticisms resulting in the loss of political support on the side of 
MP. The danger of the sales to foreign capital as a policy option was the major 
lesson to be drawn out of the MP privatization. It is clear that, today's coalition 
government did not learn much about the past experiences as the attempts at block- 
sales to foreigners still continues. Having completely different assumptions and 
definitions of privatization and of state's relationships with the public sector, neither 
SDPP nor TPP attempts at finding a solution based on the consent of every 
stakeholder involved in the process (including parties, people, pressure groups and 
employees) to overcome the crisis situation .
Civil-society by definition is the capacity to create consensus progressively as a 
means o f resolving conflicts about fundamental claims (Heper, 1985, p.5). Relatedly, 
different socio-economic groups had to be brought together vis-à-vis the central 
authority. However , the existence o f a dominant state structure in Turkey led to the 
subordination o f individuals to the state, both in economic and political terms. 
Similarly, Mardin , in his analysis on the civil-society , links individual freedoms to 
the autonomy of economic classes within the unit o f state (1992, p. 13). Against this 
short background , the MP government aimed at reducing the scope of state and 
civil-bureaucracy in Turkish politics. Privatization o f SEEs was one of the policies 
that was used in this direction. Turgut Ozal aimed at increasing the role of 
individuals in economics together with pushing the interest-groups to the fore thus
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strengthening civil-societal elements and pluralism in Turkey, By the transformation 
of state property to individual ones (with the examples of the sale of Bosphorus 
Bridge and opening of Teleta?) MP tried to create a popular capitalism, limiting the 
boundaries of state, helping to flourish economic-individualism The following 
coalition o f TPP-SDPP on the other hand -especially during the prime ministry of 
Tansu C'llsr-continued to act in autonomous fashion , free from the inputs of 
interest groups. As far as pnvatization is concerned, the 50th government is so 
involved in the ideological and methodological differentiations among themselves 
that, civil-society elements are overlooked. Of course it is hard for a government to 
achieve consensus to resolve conflicts in a progressive manner (like in the initial 
definition of civil-society) without having an agreement among itself,
When we look at the future of privatization in Turkey it is likely that the efforts will 
be directed towards finding new lowest common denominators for implementation 
as is happening lately. As far as in the short-run, the optimum solution seems to be 
focusing on the sale o f small scale enterprises by including both the domestic and 
international buyers, regulated by a broad legal framework as seen in the Mexican 
example. However, in the long run, the aim must be increasing efficiency at 
macroeconomic level through fair competition, free from state regulation from above. 
Most importantly, privatization need to be taken into account not solely to rationalize 
economies o f SEEs but also to rationalize the political process o f "compromise". Still, 
there is now a more likelihood of transparency and the path of privatization in 
Turkey seems to be irreversible.
Recently, broader issues concerning the "appropriate role of state" have also been 
debated in Turkey. These issues mainly include the current nature of the
7^
parliamentary system, the role of civil-society and the significance of the rule of law 
along with the search for a stronger executive. Although these topics are all 
somehow linked with privatization issues, they are new areas to be researched in 
other studies.
7(.
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